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REVIEW ESSAY

The Modem Construction of Myth. By Andrew von Hendy.
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2002. Pp. 400. he. $39.95. 0-253-33996-0.

REVIEWED BY ERWIN COOK

T

he Modern Construction of Myth, by Andrew von Hendy, is an interdisciplinary

survey of the construction of myth in the late eighteenth and nineteenth cen
turies.The author's thesis is that modern theories of myth can be divided into

three broad groups, folkloristic, ideological, and constitutive, and that they all derive

from an original, romantic, construct.The survey is organized diachronically, with some
attention to taxonomy and axiology. I find the author's thesis entirely persuasive: what
follows is meant to serve as a guide to the overall argument and additionally to highlight
various important threads that remain somewhat diffuse in a book of this scope.
In brief, the author argues that romantic authors created the category of myth to desig
nate narrative that provides insight into transcendental truths, communicated in sym
bols whose irreducibility makes them an inexhaustible source of meaning. In the first
three chapters, von Hendy charts the development of this view: renaissance belief that
myth is a form of moral instruction is discredited by early romantic authors, who
increasingly accept myth on its own terms as a product of the savage mind, and as the
expression of unmediated religious experience, particularly of nature.To illustrate, von
Hendy contrasts Bacon, who follows ancient tradition in treating myth as allegory, with
Fontenelle, whose progressive model of human history leads him to treat myth as the
irrational speculation of primitives endeavoring to explain the world about them. Von
Hendy finds this shift of perspective so radical and definitive of subsequent theorization
of myth as to justify the claim that the modern understanding of myth originates in the
romantic era.
Vico shares Fontenelle's historical assumptions, but draws from them the revolutionary
inference that since culture itself is a product of the human mind, the evolution of cul
ture must itself mirror the evolution of human consciousness: "in more current diction,
consciousness itself turns out to be historically conditioned; assumptions about a uni
versal human nature must be reconsidered"

(9). And although men of the first age were

irrational primitives, they were also poets of unmatched imaginative power: their expe-
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rience of the world was unmediated by knowledge, reason, and abstract thought, and
they communicated that experience in "imaginative universals" (as opposed to "intelli
gible universals;• or simple abstractions drawn from particulars). Vico's concept of the
imaginative universal thus anticipates the later romantic "symbol" in which signifier is
united with the signified, and, still more astonishing, it has a pronounced affective
dimension: "in its ambition to unite cognitive generalities with affective particularities it
is the initial registration of [a problematic] that will come to seem endemic to modern
theories of myth"

(11). Myth itself is identified as a symbolic mode of cultural construc

tion belonging to the first stage of a stadia I metahistory leading from the Age of Gods
to that of Heroes and finally of Men. No serious student of mythology will be unaware
of the central role played by Vico in modern theories of myth, but the juxtapositions von
Hendy creates between these various seventeenth- to nineteenth-century authors, and
their contextualization in the romantic movement, are most welcome and illuminating.
Several enduring trends in theorizing myth emerge already at this early date.The degen
erative model of human history inherited by Bacon is replaced by a progressive model
that aligns myth with "primitive" thought. The development of abstract modes of
thought diminished the immediacy of human experience and with it our mythopoeic fac
ulty: whereas for Vico this loss was compensated for by the rise of culture and its emol
uments, for early romantic poets such as Schiller, Wordsworth, and Holderlin, the loss
was painful, creating nostalgia for an unmediated experience of nature, a world before
the mechanistic worldview, the "entgotterte Natur;· bequeathed to man by Newtonian
physics. But even as these romantic authors mourn the dissociation of sensibility and
the lost unity of Vico's first man, others affirm humankind's mythopoeic power as ongo
ing and universal. ChapterTwo is devoted to the role these authors play in the construc
tion of myth. Blake and Novalis, for example, construct allegorical accounts of how mod
ern man may overcome the dissociation of sensibility that are themselves demonstra
tions of that power. For these authors, myth is the means of restoring coherency and
unity to Western culture, and they see their demonstration that mythopoeia is a univer
sal human faculty as legitimizing modernity. They also play an important role in the
process of psychologizing the hero by internalizing the quest romance.
In the latter half of the eighteenth century, Heyne and Herder helped popularize the term
"myth" and frame its romantic meaning (discussion of the two should have been further
developed, especially as von Hendy refers to Herder's views in passing). Herder's belief
that myth is a religious response to nature finds echoes in the poetry of Schiller,
Holderlin, and Wordsworth (and is treated as a given a century later by Ruskin). At the
turn of the century, Schlegel, in Dialogue on Poetry, has Schelling argue that modern
poetry is inferior to ancient because "we have no mythology" representing a unified sys-
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tem of belief (a point he has in common with Herder and Schiller). His solution is in effect
an endorsement of Blake and Navalis's project: that is, the answer to having no mythol
ogy is to create one. Schlegel's view that mythopoeia is a universal human faculty is fun
damental to numerous subsequent theories of myth.
Schiller adopts the use of "symbol" in the sense of Kant's "aesthetic idea;• and is soon
followed by Schelling, Schlegel, and Goethe. Symbol and myth are both seen as taute
gorical, "a self-referential category that eludes exhaustive allegorical explanation"

(36).

Over time, the meaning of symbol is transformed from that of a tautegorical mode of
communication to one that is "miraculous"-that is, the symbol participates in transcen
dent religious reality. This is the view taken by Coleridge, Creuzer, and Schelling himself,
and it becomes canonical in the later nineteenth century. Whereas Schlegel has Schelling
blur the distinction between myth and poetry, Schelling himself conflates symbol and
myth. Creuzer, on the other hand, confronts the fundamental distinction between the
immediacy of the symbol and the temporal dimension of narrative and ends up demot
ing myth to secondary status vis-a-vis the symbol. Each of these conceptual moves has
an enduring legacy among twentieth-century theorists.
Schelling contributes two additional tenets to the romantic construction of myth that
remain influential in the twentieth century:

1) myth "belongs to an unconscious, teleo

logical process" that stands outside time and history, and
their own social world and myth is constitutive of it

2) as in Vico, humans create

(39). While Schelling accepts the

enlightenment view that human consciousness has evolved from savagery to scientific
rationalism, he does not accept the view of Vico and Schiller that such progress entails
a loss of creative imagination. Instead he sees consciousness as evolving in stages along
a circular or spiral path that will one day reconstitute the dissociated sensibilities
mourned by Schiller.
In Chapter Three, von Hendy charts two divergent and often opposed trends in nine
teenth-century attitudes towards myth. Among literary authors and artists, myth is
increasingly seen as a means of achieving transcendence. During this same period, how
ever, Marx, Nietzsche, and the Brothers Grimm laid the groundwork for post-romantic
theories that reject this view.The path that von Hendy here takes from Hegel to Marx via
D. F. Strauss and Feuerbach is a familiar one, but his larger thesis again allows von
Hendy to present the material in an interesting light: von Hendy zeroes in on Hegel's
argument that "belief;' a sum of social practices driven by prejudice, superstition, and
other errors, constitutes a tissue of "false consciousness:• Hegel's view that history is
structured by a struggle between enlightenment and false consciousness is fundamen
tal to subsequent dialectical approaches to myth.
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D. F. Strauss, who accepts the view that myth reflects a society's Weltbild, relegates
"myth" to the status of false consciousness and thereby explicitly historicizes it as
belonging to an early phase in humanity's progress to true religion. In response to Hegel
and Strauss, Feuerbach argues that all theology and with it attempts to imagine divinity
are simple projections. Marx, in turn, applied Feuerbach's arguments on the nature of
religion to the study of material culture in order to unmask its underlying "ideology;'
which thus corresponds to Hegel's false consciousness. Marx, however, criticizes
Feuerbach for treating the "human essence" as an abstraction situated in the individual,
arguing instead that it is the ensemble of social relationships within a given culture.
Carlyle shares the romantic view that myth can restore unity to modern culture, and he
affirms our ability to attain transcendental knowledge. Symbols are viewed as the means
by which humanity constructs its social worlds, while myth constitutes religious symbol
ism and is a communal product that in turn produces cultural cohesion. Thus histori
cized, Carlyle reaches the conclusion that myths and symbols can "die" with the cultures
that produce them. He also historicizes the hero with a devolutionary model of myth in
which the hero begins as divinity, but is transformed over time in a series of displaced
avatars of which the last is the hero as king. Versions of this model will be taken up by
subsequent authors of a historicizing bent, such as Frye.
The Brothers Grimm helped popularize an ethnographic approach to myth that posed a
more immediate challenge to romantic theory.The Grimms treat myth seriously as a dis
tinct genre of narrative that at once is bound by and informs the culture that produces
it.They also introduce the modern distinction between myth, legend, and fairytale. This
taxonomy, with its implicit historical model in which myth degenerates over time to the
status of mere tale, is a recurrent feature of subsequent theorizing on myth, especially
among anthropologists. Von Hendy might have noted that these categories have no
basis in ancient taxonomy (on Boas's findings, see below).
Von Hendy next briefly treatsTennyson and Wagner, who are said to produce "parables
of myth"

(64) and to share the belief of Carlyle and Grimm that myths promote cultural

cohesion. Ruskin and George Eliot, on the other hand, hold that "myth offers private
access to religious inspiration" and to eternal verities

(67; my emphasis). In Eliot's

Middlemarch "we encounter a suggestion that people may actually embody mytholog

ical archetypes, and in Daniel Deronda that 'myth' operates within us at an unconscious
level"

(68). Von Hendy concludes with a discussion of Nietzsche, whose early forays into

the ritual origins of Greek tragedy in ecstatic choral performance were a formative influ
ence on the myth and ritual school. In his later work, Nietzsche is said to treat myth as a
socially constructed, and necessary, illusion, a "vital lie" that can be extended to under
stand all cultural constructions

(74).
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In Chapter Four, von Hendy shows how in academic circles the transcendentalist view of
myth loses out to anthropological approaches in the latter nineteenth century. Myth is
increasingly viewed as the sacred narrative of primitive societies, remote in either time
or place. Thus, although they reject romantic transcendentalism, these early anthropol
ogists maintain the link between myth and religious experience. Von Hendy begins with
Muller's theory of myth as cognitive failure, which is shown to be regressive in many
respects, above all in treating ancient mythology as having degenerated from an origi
nal monotheism. This degeneration is a consequence of linguistic errors-for example,
of taking metaphors literally.
Von Hendy next turns to the cognitively based theories of Comte, Tylor, and Spencer.
Comte argues that human consciousness progresses through three "states" of develop
ment: theological, metaphysical, and scientific (following in metahistorical traditions as
old as Vico and Schelling). The theological phase is in turn divided into fetishism, poly
theism (itself having three phases), and monotheism. Comte sees myth as originating in
polytheism, and perhaps not even in its earliest phase, so that myth is developmentally
late and a secondary rationalization. Since Comte believed that ontogeny recapitulates
phylogeny, mythopoeia becomes a property of the savage and childish mind. Romantic
belief that artists too have mythopoeic ability can now be explained as a case of arrest
ed development.
Tylor and Spencer share Comte's view on the lateness of myth and on its status as reli
gious narrative.Tylor adapts Comte's tripartite model of religious development by sub
suming fetishism and polytheism under the rubric of animism, which is in turn followed
by monotheism. Myth, located in this animistic stage, is again mental error, as in Muller,
though the causes of such error are much broader and myth does not degenerate over
time, but instead mirrors the evolution of human thought. His belief in pre-linguistic
"material" myth again raises the issue of the relationship between myth and narrative,
and he follows the romantics and Comte in holding that myth originates in personifica
tions of nature. Tylor, who introduces the "hero" to anthropological discourse, situates
the hero in his historical framework, concluding that similarities in the heroes of world
mythology reveal universal mental laws governing the imaginative process.Tylor is also
remarkable for the emphasis he places on myth in his anthropology, an emphasis that
proved highly influential in the future course of the discipline.
In the last quarter of the century, myth is increasingly understood in affective terms.
W. R. Smith is identified as a transitional figure who treats myth as cognitive and reli
gion as affective, the latter consisting not of a system of beliefs but of ritual action by the
group. Myth is again viewed as a secondary rationalization, of little value in the study of
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religion. Smith thus lays the cornerstone to the " ritual theory of myth": whereas roman
tics understand myth in terms of symbol, anthropological approaches link it to ritual.
Von Hendy next seeks to explain the far-reaching cultural impact of Frazer's Golden
Bough, a work whose shortcomings were immediately recognized by the scholarly com

munity. Von Hendy argues that part of the work's attraction came from its sprawling
dimensions and its promise of uniting an enormous body of diverse material under the
aegis of a ubiquitous fertility religion with its dying god (a promise T. S. Eliot did much
to promote). A further attraction of the Golden Bough, especially among creative writ
ers, is a darker undercurrent suggesting that beneath the thin skin of civilization we are
all savages. Under the influence ofTylor, Smith, and Mannhardt, Frazer assumes that the
human mental processes remain identical across time and cultures, and on this basis he
expands Muller's comparative method to link myths based on simple analogy. By

1900,

he had also adaptedTylor's tripartite historical model as: magic, religion, science. He fol
lows Comte, Spencer, and Smith in viewing myth as a secondary aspect of religion,
which he understands as a system of belief.
From the ridiculous to the sublime: Durkheim was inspired to investigate the origins
and nature of religion by Smith, whose influence is evident above all in his approach to
religion as group behavior, and his identification of religious with social institutions.
The key for Durkheim is to isolate the source of the intellectual "categories" on which
understanding is based. As opposed to the idealistic view that these categories are
innate, Durkheim argues that they are based on "collective representations" which a
given culture extrapolates from its own social structures. Myth is a religious mode of
collective representation, usually connected with religious rite, to which it supplies the
etiology

(98). It follows that myth is a system of classification, a taxonomy, though

Durkheim excludes it as an item of sociological study because, like Comte, he sees it as
late and secondary, and because it has a complex evolution that must be approached
by other means. He also follows Comte in stressing the role of religion in providing
social cohesion. Numerous subsequent theorists of myth rewrite Durkheim in emotive
terms.
The first individual to do so was Durkheim's friend Lucien Levy-Bruhl, who in his later
work treats collective representations as powerfully "expressive conceptualizations of
the sacred"

(103). He subscribes to Durkheim's view of myth as secondary and late, but

as a collective representation he finds that it too is loaded with affect. For Levy-Bruhl,
myth mediates between the intangible supernatural world and quotidian sensory expe
rience.The actual performance of a myth, together with its contents, also serves to rein
force social cohesion.
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The Cambridge Ritualists also theorize myth in emotive terms. Like Frazer, they met with
immediate and damning criticism, but exercised enormous influence on contemporary
writers. The basis of their approach is that, as in Comte, ritual is primary and myth a sec
ondary rationalization. In Themis, however, Jane Harrison gives myth enhanced stand
ing as simply an alternative mode of expression: ritual expresses emotion through
action, myth through words. Myth, then, does not originate in order to explain, though
it may become etiological if the corresponding rite is lost. Like Levy-Bruhl, Harrison thus
takes Durkheim's intellectualist theory of primitive religion and recasts it in emotive
terms-in her case under the acknowledged influence of Nietzsche's vitalism-so that
religion unites the community in its celebration.
In Chapters Five through Eight, the emphasis shifts from diachronic history to taxono
my, as von Hendy surveys the resurgence of romantic thought among modernist
authors and popularizers in the early twentieth century. This resurgence was fueled by
the contemporary shift from cognitive to affective approaches to myth, and a correspon
ding shift from the search for origins to that of structure. Chapter Five is devoted to the
role of depth psychology. Romantic influence on the approaches to myth by Freud, Jung,
and their disciples is evident in their concept of the "symbol;' and their belief in
mythopoeia as a universal human faculty. Jung also adopts romantic transcendental
assumptions, but Freud does not and he cannot therefore be considered neo-romantic.
Freud's own investigations into the psychological roots of literature led him to treat all
imaginative activity, including myth, as analogous to dream consciousness. Myth thus
becomes disguised wish fulfillment, a cultural fantasy of displaced libidinal desire that
remains constant across cultures and millennia, and is also simultaneously the fantasy
of the individual. Such analysis relies heavily on a universalizing of the human psyche
and on a relatively fixed symbolism.
For Freud's disciple 0. Rank, hero myth is informed by the libidinal development of boys:
hero myth thus becomes a psychological adventure story in which the hero represents
the ego. In striking continuation of the path taken by Blake and Novalis, depth psychol
ogy thus helped domesticate and interiorize the hero and his quest by treating him as
the product of a universal human fantasy. Behind this lies a Lamarckian belief. shared by
Freud, that psychological states such as Oedipal guilt are biologically inherited.
Jung and his followers loom rather larger in this narrative than I am accustomed to see
ing, though there is no denying their impact, particularly among creative writers. Jung
develops a theory of cultural origins in a spiritualized libido that is not reducible to sex
ual drives, although cultural taboos cause the libido to become creative. The libido is
viewed as a benign, dynamic force that transforms animal into higher urges and all sym
bols can be reduced to it. Jung accounts for the universality of the symbol, a term he
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takes directly from Creuzer, with his theory of a collective unconscious containing arche
types that are the basis of culturally mediated symbols and myths. While for Freud, myth
disguises unconscious urges in symbolic form, Jung holds that symbols mediate
between consciousness and the unconscious, "their function being to convert libido
from a 'lower' into a 'higher' form"

(131 ) . Jung also sees hero myth as structured by the

process of libidinal development: the hero is now the subject of a quest romance in
search of his adult identity. Myth remains the sacred narrative of primitive society, but it
is also a universal mode of thought accessible to the modern imaginative faculty, and its
cultivation a key to mental health.
Chapter Six shows how modernist authors such as Yeats, Lawrence, and T. S. Eliot pop
ularize assumptions about the nature of myth so successfully as to spark a revival of the
orization. Affective theory in anthropology and depth psychology emboldened these
authors to assert that myth can provide an immediate experience of our racial past. Myth
is thus affirmed as expressing eternal truths and as the vehicle of our escape from
modernity by offering access to a timeless mystery religion.The attempt of these early
modernists to regain a lost unity of sensibility thus continues in the tradition of Blake
and Novalis. Yeats and Lawrence not only subscribe to romantic transcendentalist
assumptions about myth but also to their spiral historical patterns and to their belief that
mythopoeia is a universal human faculty that can restore cultural coherency. Joyce by
this reading emerges as a model for postmodern approaches to myth, with his recogni
tion of the self-consciousness of modern myth making. He thus subverts the views of his
fellow modernists: his practice is ultimately ironic, and modern mythopoeia is exposed
as simply another form of intertextuality.
Chapters Seven and Eight survey the rise of mid-twentieth-century neo-romantic theo
ries stimulated by the anthropologists, psychologists, and literary authors discussed in
the previous chapters. Chapter Seven treats authors interested in the "linguistic, episte
mological, and aesthetic implications of a universal mythopoeic faculty"

(154). Cassirer

is inspired by the work of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl to use myth and religion to chart the
evolution of human consciousness (I would have welcomed a more systematic engage
ment with Schelling's influence here). Cassirer distinguishes among various symbolic
modes of thought that originate in, and to various degrees remain permeated by, a fur
ther category of "mythic;· itself affirmed as a permanent feature of human conscious
ness. For Cassirer, all thought is symbolic, though he does not use the term in its roman
tic sense, but rather as designating signs within a semiotic system: their function is to
mediate our experience of reality which we can no longer confront directly. He thus
denies the symbol its transcendental value but affirms its affective dimension, thus
returning us to a problem as old as Vico. All symbolic thought, in turn, serves to objec-
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tify: myth objectifies feelings, specifically of life as a unity, and does not distinguish
between appearance and reality. The affective dimension of mythical thought leads
Cassirer to argue that myth includes an original action and emotive experience as well
as narrative, which is viewed as a secondary mediation: "we encounter once again this
fundamental stumbling block of romantic speculation"

(156). At the same time, "Cas

sirer's message that mythical thought is enmeshed in the symbolic form of the artist's
work constitutes an important mediation between nineteenth-century romanticism and
mid-twentieth-century theorists of a New Critical bent"

(160). On these foundations, he

develops an Hegelian inspired model of the history of religion in which mythic thought
gradually achieves self-awareness as a symbolic mode with an affective core. Through
out much of his career, Cassirer's view of mythic thought is thus benign. In his final work,
however, written in the aftermath of National Socialism, Cassirer acknowledges the dan
ger of myth's affectivity: Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl's image of a people united in the
ecstatic dance of their religion is reconfigured so that myth becomes a totalitarian men
tality, a beast waiting in the shadows.
Urban adopts Cassirer's semiotic concept of the "symbol" and similarly distinguishes
among various symbolic modes, of which poetry, instead of myth, stands opposed to
science. Myth is itself the narrative expression of religious emotion, an encounter with
what Otto famously termed the "mysterium tremendum;• but it can also be viewed as
analogical thought generally and as inherent in all language. He thus exposes "what
turns out to be in the twentieth century a significant split between ' myth' in the relative
ly narrow generic sense and 'the mythical' as the fictive aspect of all our mental con
structions"

(163).

Wheelwright develops an opposition between expressive and referential language, in
which science is again opposed to myth along with poetry and religion. In the course of
his career,. he seeks to reconcile his view of myth as the narrative of primitive cultures
and, following Cassirer, as a primary mode of thought. He accomplishes this by treating
myth as a two-stage process in which a "mythoid" stage of awareness motivates a nar
rative rationalization of-especially religious-experience. His analysis owes much to
Cassirer and Frye and is significant chiefly as a first attempt at a fully semantic approach
to myth. Von Hendy also finds that Urban and Wheelwright leave open the possibility
that myth is simple self-projection, thus anticipating "constructive" theory.
Frye combines Frazer and Freud in a unified theory of literature based on myth, viewed
as the union of ritual, which supplies the narrative, with dream (i.e., libidinal fear and
desire), which supplies the thematic content. Behind this fusion of anthropology with
depth psychology stands a synthesis of romantic speculation centered on deriving liter
ature from myth and religion that also owes a good deal to Blake, from whom Frye
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derives his theory of literary symbolism. For Frye, as for Freud and Rank, the hero rep
resents the ego, and he continues Carlyle's project of charting the evolution of the hero
through Western literature, which he does in terms of the hero's democratization and
psychologization. Frye thus posits five stages in the hero's development, in the first of
which the hero is a god and the narrative a myth. He thus endorses Cassirer's metahis
tory but views that as ultimately cyclical, as in Schelling. But Frye also posits five phas
es in the evolution of the symbol, of which the fourth is the concrete universal of roman
tic theory, and it is within this matrix that he locates the creation of myths uniting dream
and ritual. Von Hendy observes that these different conceptions of myth are never rec
onciled in Frye's work. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Frye is completely aware of
the traditions in which he is operating, and his work is generally much more coherent as
a result.
Chapter Eight is devoted to mid-century popularizers such as Eliade, Neumann, Graves,
and Campbell, whose theoretical justification for assigning a place to myth in modern
life continues the romantic project of a Yeats or Lawrence. Although they base their
analyses on ethnology and psychology, these authors seem no longer aware of the
larger intellectual tradition in which they operate. Eliade insists that whenever humans
experience the sacred through ritual and myth "they enter the timelessness of the orig
inal event"

(194). Myth is a narrative of creation that invests a culture with its values,

beliefs, and rituals (a commonplace since Malinowski). For Eliade, this allows us to
escape modernity, which he views with romantic jaundice, and Jungian psychology is
an important tool in that escape. His concept of the symbol is taken directly from Jung,
who as we have seen takes it from the romantics. Neumann, on the other hand, com
bines the Jungian model of libidinal development with a Hegelian inspired history of
the evolution of consciousness. Myth is thereby viewed as the phenomenology of a
teleological process.
Lord Raglan treats hero and god as interchangeable concepts: the hero is a god in ritu
al, and the god a hero in myth.The hero's reduced mythological status reflects romanti
cally inspired notions of a decline explicit in Raglan's theory that when it becomes
detached from ritual, heroic myth degenerates into saga and folktale in a series of
"increasingly 'displaced' analogues of the plot and characters of the sacred original"

(193). Raglan remains influential among theorists who seek to derive literature from
myth and ritual: assertions, such as that romance is disguised myth, attest to his influ
ence on Frye. Although Raglan scorned psychological approaches to myth, his justly
famous diagnosis of a transcultural narrative pattern underlying hero-myth is broadly
compatible with such approaches (and in fact significantly overlaps the one outlined by
Rank). Raglan's findings would thus seem to support Tyler's view that heroic myth
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reveals universal mental laws. He also observes that hero-myth commonly centers on
liminal moments, concluding that hero myth develops out of commonly experienced
rites of passage in early societies.
Robert Graves likewise belongs to the ritualist school. Graves argues that an early fertil
ity religion centered on a mother-goddess has survived into modernity in disguised
form.This goddess is the Moon, or the Muse, and myths honoring her are narrated in a
magical, poetic language. He is thus working in the tradition of Frazer, whose work he
sought to improve upon and supplant.
Like Neumann, Joseph Campbell takes a Jungian approach to hero myth, though he
focuses on the latter half of the hero's career, while Neumann focuses on the first. And,
like Neumann and Frazer, he seeks to disclose the "universal forms" of world mytholo
gy. The goal of this synthesis is to recover knowledge of Jung's "universal will;' the
acquisition of which defines Campbell's hero. Campbell's hero myth is based on Jung's
model of youthful libidinal development, and he proposes a stadia I history of the evolu
tion of the hero reminiscent of Carlyle.
Chapter Nine returns us to the early years of the twentieth century and the rise of mod
ern social anthropology based on systematic fieldwork. Von Hendy argues that thinkers
of a positivist and pragmatic orientation belonging to Anglophone traditions of anthro
pology-in whose number he notably includes Levi-Strauss-achieved the most signifi
cant progress on theorizing myth during this period.These early social anthropologists
take from Durkheim the view that cultural phenomena must be understood as an inte
grated system; hence there is a need for a method that can "isolate and analyze the func
tioning of the variables"

(203). Whereas Durkheim himself had little to say about myth,

these later functionalists re-introduce it into the matrix of social functions in preliterate
societies. Conversely, they introduce cultural context into the interpretive matrix of
myth. By demonstrating the significance of that context they severely undermine the
transcendentalist theories surveyed in the previous chapters.
Functionalism in a sense begins with Malinowski. Not since Tylor has myth been so
prominent an aspect of anthropology, and Malinowski's contribution is a theory of myth
as "functional, pragmatic, and affective" that has dominated British anthropology since

(204). For Malinowski, performance context tells us as much about the meaning of the
myth as the actual narrative. Myth itself is not simply sacred narrative but lived reality:
indeed, it is this shared psychological response to its performance that distinguishes
myth from other types of narrative (he continues to follow Grimmian taxonomy).
Without such fieldwork, then, all theories about the nature and uses of myth remain
speculative. Malinowski concludes that the job of myth is to codify a society's system
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of belief, values, and rites. It does so by resurrecting primeval reality and allowing the
community to live in the presence of the gods who created it.
Contemporary scholars usually distance themselves from Malinowski's later emphasis
on biological determinism and individual psychology in favor of Radcliffe-Brown's con
ception of the social function of myth. Like Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown sees myth and
ritual as affectively charged reinforcements of social values and cohesion, but he
believes that the native story tellers and audiences of myth are unaware of its actual
function. His legacy to British cultural anthropology is in fact a relative devaluing of myth
as a tool in understanding oral cultures.
Von Hendy notes that Boas's distaste for "speculation" makes him an unlikely candidate
as an important theorizer of myth. Nevertheless, Boas recognizes the importance of
traditional narrative in oral societies, and through diligent observation refutes several
nineteenth-century preconceptions about myth. Specifically, myth is not a response to
natural phenomena (a view he and Malinowski share based on their fieldwork). Nor does
it "degenerate" into folktale, and is not distinguished from folktale as "sacred narrative;'
but solely in that it describes events before humans became distinct from other animals.
Even so, no sharp line can be drawn between them, and there is little place in Boas's tax
onomy for "legend": the Grimms' tripartite schema thus collapses into two overlapping
categories of tale. Still more important is Boas's finding that any given myth is a brico
lage of pre-existing story fragments that have been ideologically elaborated for the pur
poses of social legitimization. As such, it is inherently no more stable than the social sys
tem that produces it. Nevertheless Boas accepts Wundt's distinction between narrative
and mythical concepts, "a recurrent theme in the problematic of myth ever since
Creuzer;' although he allows "for a more conservative element in tales that undergo ide
ological elaboration"

(220).

A second counter-trend response to the emergence of nee-romanticism is the subject of
ChapterTen, in which von Hendy traces the career and influence of Levi-Strauss. Levi
Strauss's work is described as an eclectic mix of French, specifically Durkheimian, soci
ology, structural linguistics, and American anthropology. Von Hendy focuses on the
anthropological angle so as to provide a relatively fresh perspective on some extreme
ly well-worn material, though his dismissal of structural linguistics makes this a chapter
for the initiated. Von Hendy's major contribution here is in allowing us to see more plain
ly than in any other survey the degree and manner in which Levi-Strauss can be seen as
responding to and building on the work of Boas and his disciples. For example, he
accepts Boas's diffusionist model, and goes on to provide an explanation of why myths
can either "die" or be reinvigorated by crossing cultural borders. And, like Boas, he
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argues that without a wealth of ethnographic comparanda it is impossible to understand
a culture's myths.
Levi-Strauss's notorious declaration that myth is able to communicate its structural mes
sage in even the worst translation is taken to imply that its messages transcend "any
verbal function" (232). He is thus seen as confronting the central issue in Creuzer, and as
adopting his solution. His innovation consists of asserting that myth conveys its mean
ing through the individual units of action, represented as simple sentences. But myth
also transcends narrative in the sense that its message is not derived from the diachron
ic sequence of events, but from a synchronic system of relations organized by analogy
and polarity. As a consequence, the meaning of myth eludes its audience as completely
as in Radcliffe-Brown. Levi-Strauss thus shares with the depth-psychologists the belief
that myth is an unconscious process that communicates its messages in code, though
the nature of the coding is different. By providing a model designed to overcome logical
contradictions in a culture's beliefs through progressive mediation, it serves a pragmat
ic function, as in Malinowski, but that function is cognitive rather than affective, as in
Tylor. He also provides an ingenious reformulation of the degenerative paradigms that
litter modern theories of myth, according to which myth "degenerates" into literature by
a progressive weakening of its oppositions, the final and most degenerate being the
modern novel. Levi-Strauss thus gives us a theory of myth that does not patronize "sav
age thought" but treats it as highly sophisticated. The chapter concludes with a survey
of criticisms and modifications of Levi-Strauss, along with a general retreat from "grand
theory:·
Whereas Chapters Nine andTen structurally detach Levi-Strauss from French scholar
ship, using Dumezil to introduce Chapter Eleven detaches the school of Vernant and
Detienne from Levi-Strauss. In this case, however, the resulting juxtapositions fail to illu
minate-though the individual analyses remain of high quality-leaving us with a group
of authors united only by topic and with very different approaches that von Hendy some
times strains to connect. Dumezil is identified as the father of modern comparative
mythology with his combination of historical linguistics, following in the tradition of
Muller, and a Durkheim-inspired theory of myth based on social structure. As in Muller,
myth is said to degenerate over time, albeit from an original trifunctional ideology, as
opposed to theology, so that the gods of myth become the heroes of epic (more discus
sion of recent challenges to Dumezil would have been helpful here).
Burkert is credited with reinvigorating the "myth and ritual school" by basing it on dif
ferent premises than his predecessors. In one of the more lurid moves in the book, von
Hendy then uses Girard to illuminate the intellectual currents that inform Burkert (with
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the result that he overstates the triangulation with Lorenz). License to do this is provided
by Burkert's own remark that Girard and the school of Vernant and Detienne had helped
revive interest in the role of sacrifice in ancient religion. But with Girard's Freudian
inspired explanation of the origins of sacrifice Burkert has nothing in common, and
though he dutifully cites "the Parisians" when they treat identical themes, his French col
leagues are less inclined to return the favor because they do not see their approaches as
compatible.
Burkert's own contributions to the theorization of myth include establishing, more con
vincingly than any other ritualist, the priority of ritual to myth: ritual behavior precedes
the human species, while myth is not only linguistic-a disputed point, as we have seen
-but unknown to us before the invention of writing.Their different origins do not, how
ever, preclude them from growing together to achieve a "symbiosis:• Burkert also pro
vides what von Hendy notes has become the "gold standard" among Classicists as a
definition of myth: "the specific character of myth seems to lie neither in the structure
nor in the content of a tale, but in the use to which it is put . . . myth is a traditional tale
with secondary, partial reference to something of collective importance"

(269; quoting

Burkert).
Von Hendy introduces what he terms the "Paris School" by noting that whereas Burkert
traces sacrificial ritual from its putative origins in the Paleolithic, Vernant, Detienne, and
their followers investigate Greek myth and ritual as part of an integrated cultural system:
their approach is thus temporally narrower and culturally more inclusive, and their goal
is to disclose the collective representations that characterize ancient Greek thought.
Whereas myth thus belongs to, and following Levi-Strauss must be studied in terms
of, this broader cultural system, myth and the gods of myth comprise their own interre
lated systems and cannot be understood in isolation. The project of a Frazer or Graves
is thus doubly damned. In its place, the school of Vernant and Detienne opens a per
spective on the structures of Greek thought that is at once extremely rich and deeply
unfamiliar.
ChapterTwelve returns us to the troika of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. Von Hendy notes
a fundamental transvaluation of Marx's concept of ideology under turn-of-the-century
affective theories, so that ideology increasingly comes to be seen as unconscious and its
meaning broadened to include the entire superstructure. A consequence is what von
Hendy terms a "mythward drift of ideology;· myth being now understood simply as false
belief (280). We are thus dealing with an abrupt shift in the material under investigation,
partially masked by a common term, that could have been better sign-posted and justi
fied. Some appeal to Plato is surely called for, and von Hendy could have used
Horkheimer and Adorno's ideological reading of the Odyssey to show that whereas ide-
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ological approaches tend to focus on the modern world, and to include non-narrative
material such as photographs, they can also be applied to traditional stories.
Sorel, however, points to an important cross-current in these larger trends with his own
positive view of myth as a group of mental images able to evoke an emotional response
of such power as to inspire revolution. As von Hendy notes, the legacy of the romantic
symbol, together with Creuzer's valorization of image over narrative, is clear. Whereas
for Sorel "myth" is opposed to ideology, Mannheim treats myth as enforcing it.
Althusser, moreover, very nearly conflates myth and ideology in his Lacanian inspired
revaluation of Marxism that treats ideology as a "normally unconscious, affective, and
universal"

(289) mode of production used in the construction of culture. Myth, in turn, is

identified as the narrative of ideology. If myth becomes virtually another word for ideol
ogy, then the proper task of the "mythologist" becomes unmasking its message. Most
explicit in this regard is Barthes, whose theory of myth is a version of Adorno's negative
dialectic: for Barthes, myth belongs to a semiological system that serves to "naturalize"
and "universalize" bourgeois culture. Heidegger laid important groundwork for this
approach by drawing out of Nietzsche-von Hendy speaks rather of finding it there-an
antinomy between humanity's need to believe in life-enhancing lies and the need for an
iconoclast to destroy them whenever they harden into idols. This amounts to an affec
tive reformulation of Hegel's history of consciousness as the human struggle between
our contradictory desires to live in the comfort of false consciousness and to achieve
self-understanding.
Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment defines the terms of this struggle
as being between enlightenment and myth, thus gesturing respectively to Hegel's faith
in rationalism and to Nietzsche's alleged nihilism. As with Barthes, their objective is a
systematic unmasking of the myths of bourgeois culture.They treat political ideology as
a subset of the broader concept of myth, though the later Adorno actually conflates the
terms. They agree with Mannheim in viewing myth as coercive, embodying cultural
assumptions that produce a fatalistic outlook. Von Hendy finds that Derrida's "concep
tion of myth as metaphor abused by metaphysics is especially close to Adorno's notion
of it as rigidified identity-thinking"

(300). Derrida is also seen as making an important if

indirect contribution to the construction of myth through the effect of his work on
romantically inspired claims about the possibility of achieving transcendence.
ChapterThirteen is devoted to philosophers and poets whose "constitutive" approach
views myth positively as the means by which humans construct their social realities.The
most influential member of this group is Paul Ricoeur, who combines hermeneutics with
the phenomenology of Heidegger and the Christian existentialists. In his early work,
Ricoeur adopts the romantic categories of the transcendental symbol and myth. He
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departs from the romantics, however, in his innovative view of symbols as always medi
ated by language and narrative, or myth, which serve to render them intelligible. Myth
is thus the narrative of the symbol: it serves to "rationalize the gulf revealed by symbol
between signifier and transcendental signified"

(311). He soon concludes, however, that

there is not one but two hermeneutics, the second being the "hermeneutics of suspi
cion" championed by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, and he places them in a dialectical
relationship rather than treating them as exclusive. Underlying his approach is the belief
that the sacred is immanent in language, but that symbols are capable of hardening into
religious idolatry: by smashing the idols, the iconoclast allows the symbols to speak
once more. Von Hendy concludes by demonstrating how very closely Ricoeur's later
work on metaphor and narrative cohere with his work on symbol and myth.
Like Ricoeur, Kolakowski's early work originates in contemporary phenomenology and
existentialism (although Kolakowski's existentialists are Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, in
addition to Heidegger). For Kolakowski, myth allows us to accept the contingency of real
ity by endowing the world with value. Myth is thus an indispensable aspect of human
thought, and its influence can be wholly beneficent, as Kolakowski sees it as being in tra
ditional cultures, though in modern societies it may also become a narcotic if it devel
ops into ideology. We are thus once again in permanent need of a hermeneutics of sus
picion, which Kolakowski identifies with the skeptical empiricism of a David Hume.
Although his theory of myth is not based on theological assumptions, it still remains
anchored in an external reality that includes Heidegger's Dasein.
Eric Gould is said to provide the first entirely non-transcendental theory of myth as
supreme fiction. Gould revives the romantic claim that modern authors such as
Lawrence, T. S. Eliot, and Joyce are no less able to create myth-what he terms "mythic
ity" than the storytellers of traditional societies. Gould seeks to validate the romantic
equation of myth and literature with a phenomenological hermeneutics that draws on
structuralist and poststructuralist critiques of both (319). Von Hendy's principal objection
to the theory concerns his attempt to reconcile Levi-Strauss's and Barthe's very different
approaches to "myth" and then apply them to his own. A more positive criticism con
cerns Gould's narrow definition of mythicity as filling with signs of the numinous an exis
tential gap between event and meaning. Instead, von Hendy proposes, mythicity can be
viewed more broadly as the "motive for the fictions that constitute the entire production
of human culture"

(320). The resulting definition of mythicity is so broad as to be a gen

eral theory of "necessary fiction:'
Blumenberg offers a very different justification of the romantic belief mythopoeia is an
enduring human faculty. For him, "the work of myth" is to interpose itself between
humanity and our fear of the unknown. To accomplish its task, myth names to make
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identifiable, employs metaphor to make familiar, and creates narrative to make accessi
ble and explicable. It divides, limits, and confines the uncanny into a system of con
traries. Myth is thus a response to existential Angst and a means of self-defense, com
parable to the role Freud assigns to religion. If this is the work of myth, then "work on
myth" commences already at the stage of naming, so that myth accomplishes its task
while being worked upon.
For Blumenberg, what makes myths endure is their Priignanz, an imprinted form at the
core of all their variations, itself the sum product of what met with success during oral
performances across the centuries. A result of this process is that myth is drained of the
affect in which it originates, so that it very nearly approaches an objective status that
helps explain its continued appeal. Myths with a high degree of Priignanz naturally invite
further "work on" them that produces new versions, but if a particular version gains
widespread currency it can become "dogma" that threatens to bring myth to an end (cp.
Ricouer's "idolatry"). Von Hendy criticizes the model on the grounds that it "requires the
essentializing of universal experience" and would still seem to require some version of
the Lamarckian hypothesis so that the affective response of numerous people can be
seen as more objective than that of an individual

(323). Blumenberg's demonstration

that the social prestige of a myth naturally invites more "work on" it could be used, how
ever, to argue that in the modern world such work is nothing more mysterious than inter
textual allusion (though why restrict this important insight to modernity?).
Like Ricoeur, Adams believes that theories of the symbol must be based on linguistics,
while avoiding Saussure's positivism. Adams seeks to derive a coherent theory of the
symbol from Vico, Herder, and von Humboldt-and corroborated in the poetry of Blake
and Yeats-that treats language as constituting reality. Otherwise, he argues, we are left
with a theory of rhetoric. Myth is the product of symbolic thought and gives expression
to all cultural fictions, itself seen as the result of humanity's innate need to invest the
world with meaning. His dialectic is thus the mirror opposite of Horkheimer and
Adorno's dark struggle between enlightenment and myth; and as in Blake and Yeats it
does not admit of Hegelian synthesis, but is an infinite series of generative contraries.
Although he affirms the romantic alignment of allegory with the positivist mentality of
modern science, he refutes the romantic opposition between it and symbol and argues
instead that the true contrary to both is the "secular symbolic:• His reason is that treat
ing the symbol as somehow embodying the numinous signified causes it to revert nat
urally to allegory.The secular symbol, by contrast, is seen as constitutive of cultural fic
tion. "Adams's theory is thus far the most systematic and detailed account available
among those thinkers who view myth as the permanent fiction-making aspect of human
thought"

(332).
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Von Hendy concludes by anticipating a problem that began for me with his discussion
of Marx, namely that his diachronic approach is less successful in the latter two-thirds of
the book. It also leads to occasional distortions: a casual reader might well conclude, for
example, that Marx and Nietzsche were actively engaged in theorizing myth, as opposed
to laying the groundwork for two of the most serious challenges to romantic theory in
the following century. Von Hendy furthers the potential for misunderstanding with sec
tion titles such as: "Marx and Engels: 'Myth' as Ideology;· perhaps in an unconscious
attempt to anchor the discussion in his overall framework. His discussion is also very
much influenced by later "work on" these authors, which they might well have served
to introduce in a less rigidly diachronic survey.That said, I would have sorely missed the
juxtaposition of Marx with Carlyle. Chapter Eleven, on the other hand, should be split up
and the section on Vernant and Detienne reassigned to its rightful place following Levi
Strauss. Lord Raglan should also be rescued from his current company in Chapter Eight
and he and Burkert placed after Jane Harrison (perhaps with some discussion of A.
Brelich).
Von Hendy again anticipates an objection I will not be alone in having when he treats
folkloristic approaches-it is indicative of our differences here that von Hendy prefers
the term "folkloristic" while I prefer "anthropological"-as an offshoot of romantic the
ory: his defense is that had it not been for Jacob Grimm and Max Muller, myth might
never have found its way into social anthropology. It seems to me, however, that this
confuses an historical accident with the intellectual traditions on which modern anthro
pological approaches to myth are based. Nevertheless, von Hendy's focus remains
squarely on the individual authors and historical development as opposed to taxonomy,
which seems to be primarily a hermeneutic convenience.
A third complaint, more serious than the other two, but understandable in the light of
the author's thesis, is that linguistics is underrepresented in a book on the modern con
struction of myth. I consider it unfair, for example, to dismiss structuralist appeals to
Saussure's linguistics as a "forced analogy" and wonder whether this is not simply a tac
tic designed to obviate discussion. The historical linguists come in for similar criticism
and neglect. A more generous appraisal of Muller, for example, might have better
explained his lasting impact on the discipline. Jan Puhvel is mentioned but once in pass
ing, and no mention at all is made of the groundbreaking work of Calvert Watkins and
Gregory Nagy. Semiotics is also underrepresented: Pierce needs a better introduction in
order to explain Lizska, and Calame's important applications of Greimasian semiotics to
the study of Greek mythology surely deserves more than a single reference to one of his
articles in a footnote.
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It is also unfortunate that von Hendy limits his readership by assuming fluency in
German and by employing critical terms and concepts that will be out of reach of many.
Indeed, von Hendy makes few concessions to his readers-an important exception
being his regular and helpful summary passages-and the conversation sometimes gets
weighed down by amassing detail that, while interesting in itself, may cause the reader
to lose sight of the book's argument. Finally, the production of the book is uneven: there
are a number of omissions and mistakes in the index which often makes it difficult and
time consuming to track down the cross-references required to follow von Hendy's argu
ment. There are also a number of typographical errors, especially in the German cita
tions, and capitalization of German nouns is more or less random. The bibliography is
likewise uneven in citing the first editions of works, something I find especially regret
table in a diachronic survey of scholarship. I also wished that von Hendy had cited the
years of the initial publications more consistently in his discussion. I hope that these
minor problems can be cleared up in a second, paperback, edition of the book that would
then be within the reach of students as a seminar text (the division of the book into thir
teen evenly spaced chapters makes it seem suspiciously as if it was designed for just this
purpose). In the end, though, none of these issues affect what von Hendy has accom
plished. For The Modern Construction of Myth is by some distance the most learned and
ambitious history of theorizing myth ever read by this reviewer. Overall, the analyses of
individual authors are of very high quality, and some are simply brilliant. It belongs on
the bookshelf of any scholar interested in the modern history of myth or romantic liter
ature, and it will prove invaluable to a good many others in the fields of philosophy,
anthropology, and religion. I have personally learned a great deal from it about authors
I thought I knew well, and about the history of a discipline in which I have long been pro
fessionally active.
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